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Summary 
This paper tackles the “pollution haven” argument by estimating the pollution content of 
imports (PCI). The PCI is then decomposed into three components: (i) a “deep” component 
(i.e. traditional variables unrelated to the environmental debate); (ii) a factor endowment 
component and (iii) a “pollution haven” component reflecting the impact of differences in 
environmental policies. The estimation is carried out for 1987 for an extensive data set 
covering 10 pollutants, 48 countries and 79 ISIC 4-digit sectors. Decompositions based on 
cross-section econometric estimates suggest a significant pollution haven effect which 
increases the PCI of the North because of stricter environmental regulations in the North. At 
the same time, the factor endowment effect lowers the PCI of the North, as the North is 
relatively well-endowed in capital and pollution-intensive activities are capital intensive. On a 
global scale, because the bulk of trade is intra-regional with a high North-North share, these 
effects are small relative to the “deep” determinants of the worldwide PCI. In sum, 
differences in factor endowments and environmental policies have only marginally affected 
the PCI of world trade at the end of the eighties. 
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1. Introduction 
 
For the environmentally minded, globalization reflected in rising trade shares in world GDP is 
worrisome, directly because the activity of trading itself generates pollution, and indirectly 
because lower environmental standards generate a comparative advantage in "dirty" industries 
for developing countries. In this context, globalization, which reduces transport costs and/or 
trade barriers, would shift investment and production of "dirty"goods to the South. As a result, 
globalization would lead to an increase in the pollution content of imports (PCI) by the North 
in conformity with what has been called the "pollution haven (PH) hypothesis" (henceforth 
PHH), and to a worldwide increase in the production of dirty products. Likewise, the literature 
has emphasized that a tightening of environmental standards in the North would lead 
industries to relocate to the South according to what is referred to as the "pollution haven 
(PH) effect". Overall, it is fair to say that empirical support for the PHH is weak, while the PH 




In his review of the state of knowledge on the PHH, Taylor (2005) points out that the 
literature lacks a compelling multi-country test of the PHH noting that the challenge for 
empiricists is to develop "clever methods that eliminate the need for some of the data". This 
paper is a first step in this direction. We argue (with some supporting evidence) that one can 
assume constancy in emissions per unit of labor. This allows us then to carry out a systematic 
global estimation of the pollution content of trade across all industrial sectors in which we 
disentangle the role of factor endowments and environmental policies from the more 
fundamental (or "deep") determinants of bilateral trade. However, because this assumption is 
strong, we also check that results still hold in the case of SO2, the only pollutant for which 
emission data are available across countries and sectors. 
 
To our knowledge, this global exercise is novel. As an example of what transpires from our 
estimates, consider the usual version of the PH effect identified in the literature. Because of a 
                                                 
3 Although the PH effect is obviously a worldwide issue involving rich and poor countries, faced with lack of 
data, researchers have conducted their investigations by carrying out "partial" studies. Effects contributing to the 
location of economic activity (see the illustrative example in section 2) have often been analyzed in the context 
of firm case studies (e.g. Eskeland and Harrison (2002)) or case studies of a particular pollutant (e.g. Antweiler 
et al. (2001) for SO2 emissions). Several studies on the US controlling for unobserved heterogeneity and the 
endogeneity of environmental policy have detected a significant PH effect (Cole et al (2005), Ederington et al 
(2004, 2005) and Levinson and Taylor (2008) using a panel data set of US industries). When covering more 
countries, the analysis is often limited to specific sectors (e.g. Cole and Elliott (2003)) with less clear-cut results.   3 
shift in comparative advantage, a tightening of Northern environmental standards will 
increase the pollution content of imports by the North. But what about the South? In reality, 
developing countries are also importing dirty products, and they may even be larger importers 
of those goods if one takes into account the fact that highly polluting activities are often 
capital-intensive (referred to as the factor-endowment (FE) effect in the literature). So a 
tightening of Northern environmental standards will also decrease the pollution content of 
imports by the South, leading to an ambiguous change of the global pollution content of 
North-South trade. But composition effects do not stop here since trade includes intra-regional 
(i.e. North-North and South-South) trade. The framework proposed in this paper weighs the 
importance of the PH and FE effects taking into account composition effects that have been 
ignored so far in the literature. 
 
Although we carry out robustness checks, data limitations force us to make assumptions about 
emission intensities so that it should be seen as first-time estimates of orders of magnitude of 
the PHH for a large set of countries in the late 80s, taking into account the following issues 
discussed in the debate. First, both PH and FE effects are quantified in a setting with a large 
set of developed (North) and developing (South) countries. Second, 79 4-digit manufacturing 
sectors are covered (not only the five dirtiest usually aggregated into one sector) and the 
analysis is carried out for 10 categories of pollutants. Third, to identify the PH effect, we use 
the lead content of gasoline (and other indicators) as a proxy for environmental stringency 
used in lieu of income per capita. Finally, a flexible gravity-type framework provides a good 
control for non-environment-related determinants of the pollution content of trade. 
 
Section 2 discusses briefly the PH and FE effects, arguing that they can be usefully captured 
by the pollution content of trade (in our case, the pollution content of imports (PCI)). Section 
3 constructs estimates of the PCI for 10 pollutants for a large cross-section of countries and 
industries accounting for roughly 60% of world trade. Section 4 estimates a model of bilateral 
trade in emissions (one for each pollutant) in which factor endowments, environmental 
policies, and `deep' determinants (i.e. all remaining determinants) are separately identified. 
These estimates then serve to decompose the relative importance of the PH and FE effects in 
the debate on the PHH. In addition to standard robustness checks on the main dataset, section 
5 drops the assumption of constancy of emissions per worker and introduces alternative 
proxies for environmental regulation. Section 6 concludes. 
   4 
2. The Pollution Content of Trade: A Framework 
 
A simple example serves to introduce the notion of the pollution content of trade, measured 
here by the pollution content of imports (PCI). The example illustrates how the PCI serves to 
analyse the trade and the environment relationship by identifying a PH effect and a FE effect. 
We then present a framework of bilateral commodity trade that is useful to link the PCI to 
underlying determinants. 
 
2.1 The Pollution Haven Effect: An Illustrative Identification 
 
To fix the terms of the debate about the PH effect, and to motivate the choice of the pollution 
content of imports (PCI), consider the following simple hypothetical example in a Heckscher-
Ohlin framework.
4 Two countries, North (N) and South (S), produce two goods, a `dirty' and 
a (completely) `clean' good, with pollution per unit of output of the dirty good being initially 
identical in N and S so that both countries are the same in all respects except that N has a 
higher income per capita than S. Assume then that environmental quality is a normal good. 
Stricter environmental standards in N will lower emissions per unit of output and abatement 
costs will raise the unit price of the dirty good. N will then import the dirty good and hence its 
trade will be "embodied" with emissions (i.e. PCINS > 0). Conversely, S will import the clean 
good from its partner and so the PCI of S will be zero as there is no intra-industry trade in a 
Heckscher-Ohlin setting (i.e. PCISN = 0). Therefore, in this two-commodity world, the PCI of 
N from S is positive (PCINS > 0) and the PCI of S from N is zero (PCISN = 0) since S imports 
the clean good. Differences in environmental standards alone lead to trade and to an increase 
in world pollution since the opportunity to trade has led to a shift in the production of the dirty 
good to S. 
 
Next, consider two experiments involving the gains from trade specialisation. First, consider 
globalization via a reduction in transport costs, or a reduction in trade barriers. This will lead 
S to specialize in the production of dirty products. Globalization thus increases PCINS in 
conformity with what has been called the PH hypothesis (some of the previously dirty 
production in N is now carried out in S under less-stringent environmental standards). As a 
                                                 
4 We could have carried out the analysis by measuring the pollution content of exports. Since the econometric 
analysis is carried out on bilateral trade, both approaches are in effect equivalent. Because export data are less 
reliable, we use imports to minimize measurement errors.   5 
second experiment, consider a tightening of environmental regulations in N. This is also 
expected to lead to a relocation of dirty industries from N to S, increasing PCINS further 
through what is referred to as the PH effect in the literature. 
 
Bring in now factor endowment differences, supposing that dirty industries are capital 
intensive (as assumed in Copeland and Taylor (2003)) and that N is relatively well-endowed 
in capital. If the PH effect was small (as suggested by recent US-based evidence mentioned 
above), then the FE effect on comparative advantage could well dominate. Assume this to be 
the case. Then, S will be importing the dirty good although it has lower environmental 
standards, a configuration referred to as reflecting the FE hypothesis according to Copeland 
and Taylor (2004). 
 
Starting from this new configuration, consider again the two experiments above. A reduction 
in transport costs and/or trade liberalization, might then lead dirty activities to move to N, 
resulting in an increase in dirty imports of S from N. Conversely, a tightening of 
environmental policy in N will have the reverse effect, with dirty activities moving to S and 
increasing PCINS. 
 
Clearly in a multi-commodity world, PCINS, PCISN ≠ 0, and if the relative strength of the PH 
effect dominates, one would expect to observe PCINS > PCISN. Thus, the relative strength of 
the PH versus the FE effect is a determinant shaping the worldwide allocation of the PCI 
between groups of countries. It also plays a crucial role regarding the impact of globalization 
or environmental policy changes on the pollution content of trade. 
 
To get a full picture of the factors underlying the evolution of the worldwide pollution content 
of trade, scale (N and S have different economic weight and both may grow) and technique 
(abatement activities are different in N and S and vary across time) effects should also be 
factored in, as well as differences in emission intensities across commodities. And since the 
debate on trade and the environment is usually couched in terms of the contribution of rich 
and poor countries, compositional effects across regions should also be taken into account. 
The framework below shows how this can be done. 
 
2.2 Framework 
   6 
Any suitable framework for a positive analysis of the PHH needs to make a distinction 
between clean and dirty sectors in terms of their damage to the environment and to link 
environmental damage directly to production activities. This is best done by embedding 
emission intensities per unit of activity in a multi-sector bilateral trade framework at the 
industry level. This allows the exploitation of the variance in the data on commodity trade and 
on emission intensities. 
 
A recasting of Romalis (2004) provides this framework. He considers a two-region (North 
and South) setting in which countries are identical in each country grouping and in which 
preferences are represented by a single consumer sharing identical homothetic preferences 
across all countries. In each country, a continuum of industries are ranked by factor intensity 
(in his case, skilled and unskilled labor and in ours capital and labor) with production taking 
place under monopolistic competition with increasing returns to scale. Firms can costlessly 
differentiate their products. Transport costs lead to a departure from factor price equalization 
which pins down the trade structure, while monopolistic competition gives rise to N-S intra-
industry trade. Romalis (2004) produces evidence in support of his model showing that a 
typical Northern's country market share of skilled intensive products rises with the skill-
intensity of the industry. Translating his results to our setting, a typical Northern country's 
market share of capital-intensive pollution-intensive products rises with the capital intensity 
of the industry. 
 
For our purposes, the combination of transport costs and monopolistic competition in 
Romalis' model results in predictions about the location of production and bilateral trade in 
each industry. Trade shares depend on the interaction of factor intensities and relative factor 
costs which in turn depend on relative factor abundance and policies. To translate these 
predictions into our bilateral setting, let  ijs M  denote imports of sector s by country i from 
country j,  ijs kl   the differences in capital-labor intensities for industry s, and  ij    the 
difference in the stringency of the environmental policies between i and j (assumed to have 
the same impact on emissions across sectors). Let  ij   capture other exogenous (or 
"fundamental") determinants of bilateral trade at the national level, which in our gravity-type 
approach include distance and other country-specific determinants of bilateral trade. Then the 
model can be expressed as:   7 
    ij ijs ij ijs , kl , f M                       (1) 
To establish the desired link between trade volumes and the pollution content of trade 
measured by the PCI, we disaggregate across pollutants and sectors, the disaggregation across 
sectors to recognize that the usual two-sector "dirty/clean" distinction is insufficient.
5 As 
usual, there is a trade-off between the variance in the data by proceeding at a disaggregate 
level and introducing measurement errors that lead to less precise and less robust results. 
 
Let then emissions per US dollar of production in country j, sector s and pollutant k be given 
by  k
js g  and define two PCI measures: (i) total import-embodied emissions across sectors,  k
ij Z , 
(expressed in terms of physical units of pollution) and average emission intensities,  k
ij G , 
(expressed as physical units of pollution per one US dollar of imports). The two PCI measures 

















G ; M g Z                  (2) 
where    s ijs ij M M  and  ijs   is the share of sector s in country i imports from country j. 
For each pollutant, the total PCI indicator (similar indicators has been previously used by 
Antweiler (1995) and Ederington et al. (2004)) and the average PCI are used in the 
econometric estimates. In our view, changes in the volume of pollution embodied in 
worldwide trade (i.e. in PCI) is the simplest, most direct step to do in the analysis of the PH 
effect. 
 
3. Measuring the PCI 
 
                                                 
5 The traditional approach relies on the less accurate comparison between "clean" and "dirty" sectors. It is true 
that, at the 3-digit ISIC level, the group of  "dirty" sectors (reported in table A2 in Appendix 2) does not seem to 
change much across pollution criteria (e.g. actual emissions vs. abatement costs, see Mani and Wheeler (1997)). 
However, the definition of "clean" sectors is more ambiguous, and the intermediate sectors that are dropped from 
the usual analysis of clean vs. dirty industries often represent a substantial part of the PCI (up to 50% for some 
pollutants according to our estimates, see table A3 in Appendix 2). Moreover, at the 4-digit  ISIC level, the 
classification of dirty sectors is not robust across pollutants. Two examples taken from the IPPS coefficients of 
the World Bank, establish the superiority of our approach. Take first the manufacture of leather products (ISIC 
3233) which is one of the cleanest activities in terms of SO2 released in the air, but also one of the most polluting 
ones in terms of metal toxic pollution. Take next sugar factories and refineries (ISIC 3118): it has the opposite 
pattern, releasing much SO2 in the air, but negligible toxic pollution. Overall, more than a quarter of ISIC 4-digit 
categories exhibit a similar pattern, ranking in the top ten most polluting sectors according to one pollution 
criteria and among the ten cleanest according to another. 
6 The average pollution content can also be called average pollution intensity.   8 
The PCI measures in section 2 are now constructed for a sample of 48 countries (29 
developing and 19 developed countries) using sectoral data on emissions for the US for 1987 
which is the only source of comprehensive data on emissions for a large number of 
pollutants.
7 These emissions coefficients are available from the US IPPS for 14 pollutants 
(here aggregated into 10 pollutants - see Table A3 in the Appendix). They are computed for 
79 4-digit ISIC industries (see Hettige et al. 1995).
8 
 
It is clear that having emissions coefficients for only one year is a major drawback and that 
applying US coefficients to a large sample of countries that includes developed and 
developing countries is problematic. How we deal with this problem will be explained shortly. 
While estimations and decompositions are carried out for 10 pollutants, to save space we 
discuss results for three pollutants widely used in other studies: sulfuric acid in the air (SO2), 
total toxic pollution (TPTT) and biological oxygen demand in water (BOWT) and report the 
decompositions for all pollutants in figure 2. All three pollutants generate relatively small 
trans-border externalities beyond those embodied in trade.
9 
 
Emission intensities in the IPPS database are only reported for the US, but we have to apply 
them to all countries in the sample. For the reasons discussed below, we assume constancy of 
emission intensities per worker across countries. Consider first the following supporting 
evidence on SO2. Olivier and Berdowski (2001) have constructed country-specific SO2 
emission coefficients for a large sample of countries on the basis of data collected by for a 
small number of manufacturing sectors. Using several methods, Grether, Mathys and de Melo 
(2009) disaggregate this data into 7 sectors and 62 countries and show that, for SO2 at least, 
emissions per unit of labor are similar across Northern and Southern countries while there is a 
large difference in emissions per unit of output between North and South (see Figure 1).  
                                                 
7 See Appendix table A1 for a list of the countries. 
8 Variables are described in Appendix 1 and Appendix table A6. 
9 SO2 is mainly emitted by fossil fuel combustion. It may cause respiratory diseases and damage trees and crops. 
It is also a prime source of acid rain, which damages forests and buildings and contributes to the acidification of 
lakes and streams. Toxic pollution is measured as toxic chemicals in air, land and water (the rank correlation 
between the total measure and the media-specific measure is 0.93 for air, 0.87 for land and 0.46 for water). It 
causes damage to internal organs, neurological functions and can result in decreased hutching success, 
reproductive problems and cancers. Biological oxygen demand in water measures how much oxygen is being 
used by aerobic microorganisms to decompose organic matter (e.g. dead plants, leaves, manure, sewage, food 
waste). If these bacteria use too much of the dissolved oxygen, then not enough will be left for other organisms.   9 
 
Figure 1: SO2 Emission Intensities for North and South 
  
Note:    North: United States, Canada, High income Asia and Europe.  
South: Latin America, Africa and Low income Asia. 
 
Second, using this same SO2 data, we searched for a systematic relation between emissions 
per capita and development characteristics. Sector-specific White-robust regressions using 
PPP GDP per capita
10 as the explanatory variable confirm the pattern in table 1, i.e. that 
intensities per USD are significantly lower in richer countries. However, when intensities per 
worker are used instead of emissions per dollar of output as the explained variable, the 
coefficient is non-significant. Results (reported in Appendix table A4) suggest that emissions 
per worker are roughly constant across countries (indicating that higher emissions per capita 
in the South are compensated for by lower labor productivity in the South since eX≡E/X, 
aL≡L/X, eL≡E/L, then eX≡ eLaL).
11 
 
Third, and again on the basis of the same SO2 data, section 5.2. shows that the orders of 
magnitude suggested by the present paper do not depend on whether emissions per worker are 
kept fixed or allowed to vary across countries. 
                                                 
10 GDP per capita square terms turn out not to be significant. 
11 In the absence of factor price equalisation through trade, if within-sector differences in technology are Hicks 
neutral, a labor-abundant poor country will use a more labor intensive technique of production. Thus constant 
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Fourth, the constancy of emissions intensities by worker is in accordance with the evidence in 
Hettige et al (2000) who found that emissions per employee are roughly constant across 
countries for one of our pollutants, biochemical oxygen demand in water (BOWT). 
 
On the basis of this evidence, we adjust the US per employee IPPS coefficients,  k
s , US , L e , by 
each country's industry labor-output ratio  js js
S
J , L X / L a  , i.e.    S
LJ
k
s , US , L
k
js a e g   which 
amounts to assuming a constancy of emissions per unit of labor (section 5 uses the country-
specific SO2 emission intensities to check the robustness of our results to this assumption. 
Table 1 summarizes for the two country groupings (North and South), the main factors at 
stake: the constructed indices of PCI on the assumption of the constancy of eL, the proxy for 
the stringency of environmental policy, and factor endowments (specific variables that are 
used are explained and justified in section 4). 
 
Three patterns stand out in the data. First, as expected, the proxy indicator for environmental 
policy - the lead content of gasoline - indicates a much more stringent environmental policy in 
the North, and even if this is an imperfect proxy, the difference in average values is large 
suggesting room for strong PH effect in the data. Second, as would be suggested if FE effects 
were important, there is a great difference in the average capital-labor endowment ratios 
between the two groups of countries. Third, again not surprisingly, the volume of trade is 
much larger for the North, suggesting that composition effects might be important depending 
on the pattern of trade of the North. This is further confirmed by the share of intra-regional 
trade figures in parenthesis in total imports for both the North and the South. For both group 
of countries, inter-regional trade is only about 10% of total trade. 
 
Finally, the bottom of the table reports the `pollution haven ratio' for each one of the three 
pollutants defined for pollutant k as the ratio of the average PCI for high-income (denoted by 
subscript `N') to low-income (denoted by subscript `S') countries (for the PH-ratios of the 
remaining pollutants, see Appendix table A3): 

































Table 1:Environmental Stringency Index, Factor Endowments, 
Imports and Pollution-Haven Ratios by Country Grouping 
       
Variable (units)  Statistics 
North**             
(19 countries) 
South**           
(29 countries) 
Lead Content        
(Grams / Gallon)  Mean  0.24  0.58 
  (C.V.)  (0.76)  (0.43) 
Capital/Labor        
(1987 Thousand US Dollars  Mean  88.94  9.67 
per employee)  (C.V.)  (0.38)  (0.89) 
       
Imports*        
(Million Current US Dollars)  Mean  930 (815)
a  99 (92)
b 
  (C.V.)  (1.34)  (1.30) 
PCI-BOWT*        
(Million Pounds)  Mean  1.19  0.17 
  (C.V.)  (1.29)  (1.00) 
  PH-Ratio
c                0.89 
PCI-SO2*        
(Million Pounds)  Mean  7.24  1.27 
  (C.V.)  (1.31)  (1.32) 
  PH-Ratio
c                 0.67 
PCI-TPTT*        
(Million Pounds)  Mean  5.39  0.86 
  (C.V.)  (1.18)  (1.11) 
  PH-Ratio
c                0.63 
       
Notes: Data are averages over 1986-1988. PH-Ratios for the remaining pollutants are 
reported in appendix table A3. 
* Bilateral data averaged by importer. 
** The split by income group used 11,000$ as break point which corresponds to the 
trough in the bimodal distribution. See table A1 for the list of countries. 
a N-N; 
b S-S trade in parenthesis;
c See equation 3 for the definition.  
C.V.: Coefficient of variation, PCI: Pollution content of imports, BOWT: Biological 








PH                      (3) 
According to the reasoning in section 2.1, should the PHH find support in the raw (but 
constructed) data, and should most trade be inter rather than intra-regional, one would expect 
to find  k , 1 PH k   . The presumption here is that the PH effect dominates the FE effect. In 
fact, as shown in the bottom of the table, the opposite is the case for all three pollutants 
reported in the table (but also for the other pollutants). To go further and elucidate why the 
average PCI is systematically lower in the North (i.e.  k , 1 PH k   ), one needs to disentangle 
and take out the impact of the fundamental determinants of trade that are embodied in the 
constructed PCI. It could well be that the PCI is mainly determined by these more 
fundamental determinants of trade patterns than those identified in the PHH debate. 
 
 
4. Unraveling the Pollution Haven Effect 
 
To disentangle the correlates of the PCI, we estimate the relation suggested by equation (1). 
Assuming that determinants enter multiplicatively and omitting pollutant superscript k, the 
PCI of country i′s imports from country j,  ij Z , can be decomposed into a "deep" determinant 
component,  ij   (i.e. the import-embodied pollution that would occur for reasons unrelated to 
environmental policy and endowments), an FE effect,  ij  , and a PH effect,  ij  : 
  ij ij ij ij Z                       (4) 
This multiplicative form between the three components is easy to handle, particularly in a 
gravity-like framework and it is also convenient to carry out the decomposition that is 
proposed in the next section. We proceed in two steps. First, we regress for each pollutant k, 
the bilateral PCI,  ij Z , on a set of explanatory variables capturing the effects identified in 
equation (4). In a second step, we use the estimated coefficients to decompose the total 
predicted PCI for each pollutant into the three components, namely "deep", "FE", and "PH" 
effects. 
   13 
Estimation uses 1987 data and is based on a gravity-type equation (5) which is convenient to 
include the "fundamental" determinants of bilateral trade. The PH effect is captured by 
differences in the lead content of gasoline presented in table 1.
12 
 
The capital-labor ratio serves as proxy for endowment differences, i.e. captures the FE effect. 
To avoid erroneously attributing variations in bilateral PCIs to the two effects of interest, it is 
important to have as complete as possible a set of control variables in the vector of "deep" 
determinants. Thus the sets of α and β coefficients control for these "deep" determinants of 
bilateral trade, the former set relating to gravity-type controls, and the latter including other 
controls. The gravity-type controls include log distance (DISTij), the extent of the potential 
market (MKTij=ln(GDPi* GDPj)), proxied by the product of GDPs (since these cannot be 
entered individually in the presence of fixed effects), common religion (CRij), common 
language (CLij) and landlockedness (LLij). Importer (DMj) and exporter (DEi) dummy 
variables control for country-specific omitted determinants. 
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      (5) 
As further control variables, we include proxies for differences in natural resource 



























ln COAL ) since it is known that many pollution-generating activities are 
linked to the weight-reducing activities associated with the processing of primary products 
which are natural-resource based and hence less sensitive to differences in environmental 
policies. We also include two measures of skills since it has sometimes been claimed that 
pollution intensive activities are also skill-intensive (see Cole and Elliott (2005)). The two 
variables are differences in the skill ratio (i.e. (skilled+ base skills)/unskilled labor) 
                                                 
12 This index is a market-share weighted sum of the maximum lead content of different gasolines (see Grether 
and Mathys (2002) and appendix 1 for further details). It has been used by Hilton and Levinson (1998), Damania 
et al. (2003), Fredriksson et al (2005) and Cole et al. (2006) as a proxy for environmental policy. 




























ln HK ). To sum up, one may expect these control variables to be related to the 
bilateral PCI, although their influence is ultimately an empirical matter.
13 
To these variables we add the PH and FE variables mentioned above, namely the difference in 













ln LEAD ), and the difference in 













ln KL ). 
 
Equation (5) is estimated for each one of the ten pollutants for average values over the 1986-
88 period and observations with aggregate bilateral trade below a threshold of 10,000$ are 
dropped (leading to a loss of 3% of observations). Results for the three selected pollutants are 
discussed below (results for the remaining seven pollutants are summarized in figure 2, see 
section 4.2). 
 
Three objections come to mind when estimating (5) by OLS.
 14 First, the results could be 
entirely driven by the volume of trade rather than the composition of trade. To address this 
potential shortcoming, we regress the average ( k
ij G ) instead of the total PCI ( k
ij Z ), thereby 
focusing only on the composition effect. As the trade volume dimension is absent, the 
traditional gravity-type control variables should in principle all disappear. However, we 
maintain distance as a regressor to control for the fact that dirty industries are predominantly 
weight-reducing activities (see supporting evidence in e.g. Grether and de Melo (2004)) and 
                                                 
13 For reference, Antweiler, Copeland and Taylor (2001) estimate the correlates of per capita concentration 
intensities in 103 cities as: 
(z/N)kt = 0(K/L)kt+1Y kt +2((X+M)/Y) kt +... 
where Y is GDP k is an index for 43 countries and t = 1,16 years and +... indicates the inclusion of country fixed 
effects, interaction terms for the three RHS variables plus squared values of the three RHS variables. In this 
specification, 0 and interaction terms capture composition effects, while 1 captures the combined scale and 
technique effects and 2 captures the trade-induced effect. Cole and Elliott (2003) estimate a fairly similar 
relationship, but with emission intensities per capita as the LHS variable. 
14 We checked for heteroskedacity by using the Poisson estimator suggested in Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) 
obtaining similar results.    15 
hence might be particularly sensitive to transport costs. The alternative specification then 
becomes: 
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          (6) 
Second, one could object to the inclusion of intra-regional trade in the context of an 
estimation of the PH effect which is supposed to operate between, rather than within, regions 
so that all intra-regional bilateral trade (i.e. N-N and S-S) should be deleted. Thus, as a 
robustness check, we also report estimates of (5) over a sample that excludes intra-regional 
trade. However, as intra-regional trade should also respond to the same determinants as N-S 
and S-N trade and since we are interested in capturing the PH and FE effects at the worldwide 
level, we consider that the relevant coefficient estimates for the decomposition exercise are 
those derived from the whole sample. 
 
Finally, one could object that LEAD may be endogenous (as suggested by Ederington and 
Minier (2003) who found evidence that environmental policy has partly served as a substitute 
for protection using aggregate data). To deal with this potential problem, we also instrument 
LEAD by the UN's measure of Human development (the HDI). To be an appropriate 
instrument, the HDI has to be correlated with environmental regulation and orthogonal to the 
error term of the PCI regression. We expect that the HDI, takes into account different 
development dimensions of countries, will be directly correlated with environmental 
regulation (which it is) .Our maintained hypothesis is that the PCI is not directly affected by 
the HDI since environmental policies would be the main channels through which institutional 
and policy choices are likely to influence the PCI. So, in the absence of a better instrument, 
we stick to the HDI as an instrument for the potential endogeneity of the environmental policy 
proxy, checking robustness to the choice of environmental proxy in section 5.1, and arguing 
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4.1 Correlates of the PCI 
 
Table 2 reports results for the two specifications (5 and 6), the two samples (world or NS 
only), and for the three selected pollutants: SO2, BOWT, and TPTT. Overall, results are 
encouraging. Start with estimates of equation (5). First, the signs of the variables of interest 
are as expected in all specifications, and significant most of the time. The same comment 
applies to the gravity-related controls. For example, the coefficient on distance is negative and 
slightly higher than the "average" estimate of -1.0 from meta studies, which is what one might 
expect since weight-reducing dirty industries are more sensitive to transport costs than clean 
industries (see e.g. the estimates in Grether and de Melo (2004)). Likewise, common language 
and common religion enhances trade. Finally, landlockdness (0 if neither country in the dyad 
is landlocked, 1 if one is and 2 if both are) has a negative correlation with trade volume 
presumably via higher transport costs. As to the other controls for which we have no a priori 
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  Table 2: Pollution Content of Imports Regressions, 1987  
  Biochemical Oxygen Demand  Water (BOWT)  SO2 in the Air (SO2)  Total Toxic Pollution Intensity (TPTT) 
       Total PCI  Av. PCI  NS PCI       Total PCI  Av. PCI  NS PCI       Total PCI  Av. PCI  NS PCI 
   OLS  2SLS  2SLS  2SLS  OLS  2SLS  2SLS  2SLS  OLS  2SLS  2SLS  2SLS 
Δlead  -0.16***  -0.32***  -0.39***  -0.39***  -0.02  -0.21***  -0.19***  -0.20***  -0.01  -0.21***  -0.20***  -0.21*** 
  [5.31]  [5.22]  [10.28]  [5.37]  [0.60]  [3.86]  [6.53]  [3.05]  [0.52]  [4.26]  [7.71]  [3.36] 
Δ Capital/Labor  -0.11  -0.29***  -0.42***  -0.2  -0.18**  -0.16**  -0.36***  -0.44***  -0.19**  -0.12*  -0.41***  -0.32*** 
  [1.22]  [3.29]  [6.22]  [1.54]  [2.44]  [2.05]  [7.01]  [3.76]  [2.18]  [1.77]  [9.04]  [2.95] 
Δ Skill Ratio
a)  0.09  0.33**  -0.23*  -0.05  0.50***  0.47***  -0.14  0.18  0.38***  0.30**  -0.50***  -0.04 
  [0.81]  [1.97]  [1.93]  [0.33]  [5.24]  [3.14]  [1.48]  [1.29]  [4.22]  [2.20]  [6.18]  [0.33] 
Δ High Skill Ratio
b)  -0.18  -1.89***  0.17  -1.20***  -0.62***  -2.08***  0.21  -0.97***  -0.43*  -1.78***  0.92***  -0.55** 
  [0.75]  [7.64]  [0.91]  [4.59]  [3.17]  [9.44]  [1.46]  [4.08]  [1.91]  [9.01]  [7.30]  [2.45] 
Δcoal  -0.02  0.01  -0.10***  0.14***  0.03**  0.04**  -0.09***  0.18***  0  0.01  -0.16***  0.14*** 
  [0.79]  [0.43]  [5.88]  [3.80]  [2.03]  [2.19]  [6.52]  [5.38]  [0.02]  [0.36]  [13.50]  [4.51] 
Δoil  0.03  0  0.01  0.28***  0.05***  0.02  0.02  0.27***  0.04*  0  -0.01  0.22*** 
  [1.04]  [0.07]  [0.74]  [5.82]  [2.93]  [0.66]  [1.21]  [6.09]  [1.98  [0.18]  [0.51]  [5.12] 
Distance  -1.34***  -1.34***  -0.24***  -1.55***  -1.32***  -1.32***  -0.20***  -1.51***  -1.25***  -1.25***  -0.11***  -1.39*** 
  [15.35]  [21.23]  [5.91]  [13.12]  [15.96]  [23.58]  [6.39]  [14.05]  [15.87]  [24.95]  [3.92]  [13.59] 
GDPi*GDPj  0.94***  0.55***    0.61***  0.96***  0.59***    0.63***  0.93***  0.57***    0.61*** 
  [22.00]  [43.30]    [28.91]  [24.74]  [51.77]    [32.56]  [22.33]  [56.43]    [33.73] 
Common Language  1.14***  1.14***    0.50***  1.00***  1.00***    0.70***  0.92***  0.92***    0.49*** 
  [7.52]  [8.24]    [2.93]  [6.74]  [8.15]    [4.53]  [6.79]  [8.34]    [3.37] 
Common Religion  0.72***  0.72***    0.34  0.74***  0.74***    0.37*  0.67***  0.67***    0.35* 
  [5.18]  [4.52]    [1.63]  [5.34]  [5.25]    [1.94]  [6.42]  [5.29]    [1.92] 
Landlocked  -0.67**  -2.08***    -0.44  -0.46*  -1.57***    0.11  -0.54**  -1.54***    -0.43 
  [2.49]  [7.67]    [1.33]  [1.99]  [6.52]    [0.35]  [2.11]  [7.13]    [1.50] 
Observations  2107  2107  2107  1109  2107  2107  2107  1109  2107  2107  2107  1109 
R-squared  0.73  0.73  0.34  0.78  0.74  0.74  0.47  0.8  0.78  0.78  0.49  0.81 
Notes: Dependent variable (in log): Total PCI: Total bilateral PCI, Av. PCI: Average bilateral PCI, NS PCI: Total bilateral PCI between North and South. 
Absolute value of t statistics in brackets, in 2SLS regressions lead is instrumented with the human development index, first stage F statistics are 48.50 for the average PCI regressions and 56.43 for the others, 
fixed effects are not reported. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%, 
a) (skilled+base skills) / unskilled, 
b) skilled / base skills   18 
Second, as to the comparison between OLS and 2SLS estimates for equation (5), coefficients 
do not change sign and, except for BOWT, are very similar in terms of significativity for all 
variables apart from LEAD, which becomes significant through the instrumentation.
15 
 
In the first stage regression the coefficient of LEAD is -1.45 and significant at the 1% level. 
The F-statistics takes a value of 56.4 signifying the absence of a weak instrument problem. In 
the absence of other suitable instruments, we cannot test for the exogeneity of LEAD and we 
rely on the 2SLS estimates for the simulations reported below. 
 
When we abstract from volume effects, and hence focus on detecting PH and FE effects in the 
composition of bilateral trade (equation (6)), we still find the same signs for both variables of 
interest. Finally, estimates are sufficiently close when the sample is restricted to North-South 
bilateral trade flows indicating that the results of decompositions reported below would not be 
overly sensitive to the choice of sample. However in two out of three cases the contribution of 
the FE effect would be larger if we were to carry out decompositions based on this restricted 
sample. 
 
In sum, we retain from the estimates in table 2 that the data support the presence of PH and 
FE effects, although the OLS estimates for LEAD are not significant in two cases. The 
average values of endowments and policies reported in table 1 allow one to deduce the sign of 
these effects on PCINS and PCISN. Thus, starting from the "deep" determinants of bilateral 
trade, the PCINS will be reduced through the `FE' effect because the North has a comparative 
advantage in dirty products. Likewise, because of more stringent environmental standards, the 
PCINS will be increased through the `PH' effect. The opposite patterns will hold for PCISN. 
However, to go further, we need to take into account the fact that there is horizontal trade 
which will be reflected in PCINN and PCISS values with the worldwide effect being a weighted 
average of vertical and horizontal trade flows. We now carry out a decomposition of the PCI 
into its constituents parts. 
 
 
                                                 
15 There are two reasons why the estimate on the LEAD coefficient might be biased towards zero. First if the 
lead content of gasoline is relatively important with respect to total PCI and countries import refined gasoline 
with lead content meeting national requirements, then there could be a positive correlation between total PCI and 
lead content. Second if lead content is a proxy for environmental awareness, consumers will have a relatively 
clean consumption structure leading to a positive correlation between lead content and the PCI. However, given 
the level of disaggregation, it is unlikely that such substitution effects will be captured by the data.   19 
4.2 Decomposing the PCI into the PH and the FE effects 
 
For each region normalize the deep determinants of the PCI to unity. Then for each pollutant 
k, the total percentage increase in the PCI due to the FE and the PH effects will be given by: 
 
  1+ TOT = (1 + FE) (1 + PH)               (7) 
where FE and PH are the respective percentage increases in the PCI due to each effect. 
 
Decomposition results are reported in Table 3 for the three pollutants with overall 
decomposition results for the ten pollutants reported in figure 2 below. Take for example 
biochemical oxygen demand in water (BOWT). Starting from the base (or `fundamental') PCI, 
adding differences in factor endowments reduces the PCI by 4% while adding differences in 
environmental regulations increases the PCI by 11% so that taken together, the two effects 
increase the world PCI by 7%, which is also shown in figure 2. Next focus on the PH effect. 
The worldwide result (11% increase) is in fact a weighted average of the PH effect on intra-
regional flows (13%) and the PH effect on inter-regional flows (1%), with corresponding 
weights of 88% and 12%. Similarly, the aggregate PH effect on inter-regional flows is 
decomposed into a Northern (173%) and a Southern (-70%) component, with import shares 
being respectively 29% and 71%. 
 
Several patterns stand out in table 3. Start with row 1. As emphasized by participants in the 
PH debate, whatever the pollutant, Northern imports from the South display a significant PH 
effect resulting in a strong increase in the PCI. Likewise the FE effect is also estimated to 
have a significant impact on the PCI in the opposite direction. Move to row 2 which gives the 
corresponding decomposition for Southern imports from the North. A reverse pattern of 
similar magnitude is evident. As shown along row 3, these countervailing forces naturally 
tend to cancel out, so that FE and PH effects on overall trade are several orders of magnitude 
smaller than on isolated (either Northern or Southern) inter-regional trade. As could be 
expected, the net impact is driven by the Northern pattern, but the mitigating impact of the 
Southern PCI (at least more than a quarter of vertical PCI) should not be underestimated. 
Composition effects are also evident when comparing relative magnitudes in rows 4 and 5. 
First, intra-regional FE and PH effects are much smaller than corresponding inter-regional 
effects. Second, since 75% of the world PCI is accounted for by intra-regional trade, the 
overall effects are much smaller than those that one would obtain if considering only North-  20 
South trade as is done in typical case studies carried out for industrialized countries. These 
two results corroborate results by Ederington et al. (2006) who find stronger PH effects for 
inter-regional than intra-regional trade and conclude that because of the dominance of N-N 
trade in global trade, PH effects are likely to be small. 
 
Finally, note that the relative strength of PH and FE effects is not invariant across pollutants, a 
result which is confirmed by the differences in estimates across pollutants in figure 2. For two 
out of the three pollutants of table 3, the PH effect dominates the FE effect whatever the type 
of imports considered, while for the third pollutant (biochemical oxygen demand), the PH 
effect is only dominated in the case of Northern imports from the South. 
 
Figure 2 compares side by side the results of the decomposition for the 10 pollutants. Recall 
that the PHH is said to hold if the PH effect is positive and dominates the FE effect. No clear-
cut verdict emerges as to the strength of the PHH since it holds for 4 (Biological oxygen 
demand, SO2, total suspended particulates and NO2) out of the 10 pollutants. For one 
pollutant, toxic metal pollution, both the FE and the PH effect go in the opposite direction of 
what would be expected. “Iron and steel” and “non-ferrous metals” are the two main polluting 
industries in this case and hence a possible explanation for this counter-intuitive result could 
be the fact that these are weight-reducing and hardly mobile industries (as also suggested in 
de Melo and Grether, 2004). For the remaining pollutants, effects are either small or support 
either the PH or the FE effect but not both. 
 
These decompositions also provide an estimate of the possible reduction in the worldwide 
PCI if there were a complete harmonization of environmental policies, meaning that the world 
wide PH effect on the PCI could be suppressed, by equalising environmental regulation 
between countries. The harmonization effect can be approximately read off the relevant PH 
columns in table 3 by changing the sign (the exact estimate would be given by (-x/(1+x/100)) 
where x is the percentage change reported in table 3). For the three pollutants in table 3, 
harmonization of environmental policies would reduce the PCI by roughly 10% for 
biochemical oxygen demand and SO2 and increase it by 3% in the case of total toxic 
pollution.    21 
 
  Table 3: Decomposition of the PCI into the FE and the PH-Effect (%)   
                                   
      Biochemical Oxygen Demand Water 
(BOWT) 
  SO2 in the Air (SO2)    Total Toxic Pollution Intensity (TPTT)   
Row  Import Flows 
a)  Number of 
observations 
FE-Effect  PH-Effect    TOT-Effect    FE-Effect  PH-Effect    TOT-
Effect 
  FE-Effect  PH-Effect    TOT-
Effect 
 
1  NS  544  -68  173    -14    -44  114    20    -38  106    27   
2  SN  565  127  -70    -33    61  -65    -44    42  -64    -49   
3  NS+SN  1109  -19  1    -19    -13  15    1    -8  8    -1   
4  NN  342  -1  13    12    -1  9    9    0  -3    -3   
5  SS  656  -22  -16    -34    -1  -6    -7    -5  -9    -13   
6  NN+SS  998  -2  13    11    -1  9    8    0  -3    -4   
7  World  2107  -4  11    7    -3  10    6    -2  -1    -3   
                                   
      Ω  Ω ĸ    Ω ĸ ℓ    Ω  Ω ĸ    Ω ĸ ℓ    Ω  Ω ĸ    Ω ĸ ℓ   
8  Share of NS in NS+SN  75  29    79    70  45    83    63  42    81   
9  Share of NN in NN+SS  97  98    98    95  96    96    95  95    95   
10  Share of NS+SN in World  14  12    11    22  20    21    24  22    24   
                                   
  Notes:                                 
 
a) NS: North imports from the South, SN: South imports from the North, NN: North imports from the North, SS: South imports from the 
South. 
           
  Along rows: TOT = (1+FE)*(1+PH) -1. For example for row 7: (1-0.04)*(1+0.11)-1 ≈ 0.07. Due to rounding, the decomposition only holds approximatel. 
Along columns: AGGv = θ*CMP1+(1-θ)*CMP2  where  AGGv is the aggregate effect (v = NS+SN, NN+SS, World) CMP1 and  CMP2 are the two corresponding components and θ is the 
share of  CMP1 in the relevant PCI (Ω  for the FE and the TOT effects, Ω ĸ for the PH effect , Ω ĸ ℓ   is only reported for the sake of completeness). 
   22 
For CO, NO2 and total suspended particulates a harmonization would also lead to decreased 
pollution of the world PCI while for fine particulates, toxic metal pollution and volatile 
organic compounds, an equalisation of environmental regulations would lead to increased PCI 
(for total suspended solids in water and toxic pollution, effects would be small). Note that in 
this exercise the relative level of regulations does not matter, because only differences 
between countries would influence trade flows while in a real-world policy scenario 
regulation levels would be of major importance. 
 

























Notes:(TOT) is the sum of the factor-endowment (FE) and the pollution-haven (PH) effects 
according to the decomposition given by equation 7. 
 
 
5. Robustness Checks 
Two exercises are carried out. Section 5.1 computes confidence intervals and checks 
sensitivity to the selection of the GDP threshold used for the construction of income groups. 
Section 5.2 tackles the sensitivity of results for SO2 emissions to dropping the assumption of   23 
the constancy of eL and to the selection of two alternative proxies for environmental 
regulation. 
 
5.1 Robustness check on the main dataset 
 
As to the estimates in tables 2 and 3, three sensitivity tests suggest overall robustness. First, 
we computed confidence intervals for the predicted values of the different PCI levels. Results 
are reported in Appendix table A5. The sign of the individual effects does not change most of 
the time, but there are several changes in the total effects. Aggregate worldwide effects 
remain small, and one can conclude that we obtain the same orders of magnitude. Second, we 
checked for changes in the selection of per capita GDP threshold. Two alternative thresholds 
were considered to add or take away five countries to the original group of 19 Northern 
countries vs. 29 Southern countries. Results reported in Appendix table A6, show that the 
overall patterns are quite insensitive to this change of definition. Third, arguing that 
environmental stringency is endogenous to bilateral trade flows at the sector level is 
questionable. Indeed, one might argue that environmental stringency is less likely to be 
endogenous when bilateral trade data are used along with national environmental regulation. 
In fact, endogeneity would apply if environmental regulation were a substitute for protection. 
This would be most likely if either environmental regulation was sector specific and/or trade 
flows were only country and not country-pair specific. We therefore also report results based 
on the simple OLS regression (see table A7 in Appendix). Results are very similar. 
 
5.2 Robustness to data availability: Results for SO2 emissions
16 
Tables 4 and 5 report results of two explorations with SO2 emission data for 2000 (again 
based on the data prepared in Grether et al 2009a). First, we introduce two alternative proxies 
for environmental stringency, namely, the environmental regulatory regime index (Esty and 
Porter, 2005) and the air pollution regulation index from the WEF's Global competitiveness 
report. These proxies are only available for recent years, and are not available for all countries 
and hence our sample is reduced to 39 (38 for the regulatory regime index) countries.
17 
Second, we relax the assumption of the constancy of emission per worker (on the same set fo 
reduced countries). 
 
                                                 
16 We thank two anonymous referees for having suggested this additional robustness check. 
17 For the detailed country list, see table A1 in the Appendix.   24 
Table 4: Pollution Content of Imports Regressions for SO2, 2000 
                 
  US emission coefficients  Country-specific emission coefficients 
                 
  Air Pollution Regulation  Regulatory Regime Index  Air Pollution Regulation  Regulatory Regime Index 
   OLS  2SLS  OLS  2SLS  OLS  2SLS  OLS  2SLS 
Δ Environmental Stringency  1.96***  1.60***  1.44***  2.57***  2.68***  3.23***  1.13***  2.39*** 
  [5.04]  [4.11]  [5.89]  [10.06]  [6.94]  [7.56]  [4.78]  [8.56] 
Δ Capital/Labor  -1.35***  -1.24***  -0.78***  -0.97***  -0.65***  -0.96***  -0.17  -0.39*** 
  [8.62]  [8.22]  [6.13]  [7.71]  [3.93]  [5.79]  [1.30]  [2.82] 
Δ Skill Ratio  -0.28***  -0.33***  0.07  0.31***  -0.15*  -0.08  -0.33***  -0.07 
  [3.54]  [4.02]  [1.01]  [3.44]  [1.77]  [0.90]  [4.55]  [0.66] 
Δ High Skill Ratio  0.19***  -0.11  0.22  0.78***  0.02  0.18**  -0.04  0.60*** 
  [2.87]  [1.52]  [1.58]  [9.25]  [0.22]  [2.31]  [0.30]  [6.40] 
Δ Coal  -0.08***  -0.27***  -0.08**  -0.13***  -0.13***  -0.27***  -0.21***  -0.26*** 
  [2.96]  [9.94]  [2.10]  [4.13]  [4.42]  [8.92]  [6.35]  [7.63] 
Δ Oil  0.09***  -0.01  0.22***  0.27***  0.12***  -0.04  0.19***  0.25*** 
  [3.33]  [0.26]  [4.79]  [7.36]  [3.61]  [1.00]  [4.34]  [6.25] 
Distance  -1.44***  -1.44***  -1.40***  -1.40***  -1.41***  -1.41***  -1.39***  -1.37*** 
  [20.84]  [22.76]  [18.91]  [20.31]  [18.85]  [20.37]  [17.40]  [18.39] 
GDPi*GDPj  1.25***  0.45***  1.03***  0.48***  1.10***  0.48***  1.10***  0.49*** 
  [26.08]  [40.75]  [8.11]  [42.53]  [22.84]  [39.73]  [8.54]  [38.98] 
Common Language  0.84***  0.84***  0.86***  0.86***  0.87***  0.87***  0.90***  0.90*** 
  [6.19]  [5.43]  [6.29]  [5.39]  [5.77]  [5.16]  [5.94]  [5.18] 
Common Religion  -0.01  -0.12  0.09  0.10  -0.02  -0.02  -0.01  -0.01 
  [0.20]  [0.19]  [0.74]  [0.78]  [0.39]  [0.34]  [0.09]  [0.09] 
Landlocked  0.07  -0.36*  -0.45**  -1.47***  -1.10***  -1.90***  -1.10***  -2.24*** 
  [0.40]  [1.94]  [2.07]  [8.96]  [6.29]  [9.53]  [4.80]  [9.66] 
Observations  650  650  600  600  650  650  600  600 
R-squared  0.86  0.86  0.86  0.86  0.85  0.85  0.85  0.85 
Notes: 
See text for sample size. Dependent variable (in log): Total bilateral PCI. 
Absolute value of t statistics in brackets, in 2SLS regressions the environmental index is instrumented with the human development index, first stage F statistic is 115 with the air pollution regulation index and 72 with the 
regulatory regime index. A higher value of the index implies a more stringent policy. Fixed effects are not reported. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%, 
a) (skilled+base skills) / unskilled, 
b) skilled / base skills   25 
 
Table 5: Decomposition of the PCI into the FE and the PH-Effect (%): Results for  SO2 with two alternative measures of environmental regulation 
   
    US emission coefficients  Country-specific emission coefficients 
         
    Air Pollution Regulation  Regulatory Regime Index  Air Pollution Regulation    Regulatory Regime Index 




  FE-Effect  PH-Effect  TOT-
Effect 













1  NS  165  154  -86  118  -70    -77  321    -1  -80  472  12    -49  285  97 
2  SN  165  154  163  -56  15    145  -81    -53  237  -84  -45    68  -81  -68 
3  NS+SN  330  308  -41  -23  -54    63  -60    -34  -33  53  3    -8  53  40 
4  NN  110  110  -3  4  1    -3  -6    -9  -2  12  10    -1  -5  -6 
5  SS  210  182  -76  -11  -79    -62  -18    -67  -56  -3  -58    -28  -23  -45 
6  NN+SS  320  292  -19  3  -16    -12  -7    -18  -28  7  -23    -11  -11  -21 
7  World  650  600  -24  -1  -25    2  -22    -21  -29  17  -17    -11  1  -10 
                   
Notes: Decompositions using coefficient estimates reported in table 4. See table 3 for definitions and evaluation of the decomposition.    26 
 
Regression results are reported in table 4. Columns 2-5 report results when US emission coefficients are 
applied to all countries, while columns 6-9 report corresponding results, when country specific emission 
coefficients are used. For each case, OLS and 2SLS results are reported. The variables of interest have 
always the expected sign (note that a sign reversal is expected for the first line in table 2, as a higher lead 
content means a lower environmental stringency) and are most of the time highly significant. Results are 
also very similar across the different specifications. Table 5 shows the corresponding decomposition 
results and confirms previous findings. Although composition effects lead to a variety of patterns at the 
aggregate level, results for the first two rows, which relate to North-South trade, are perfectly in line with 





This paper contributes to the debate on trade and the environment by extending the usual case studies 
(one country or a few products) to a systematic analysis of the content of individual pollutants in global 
trade at the most disaggregated level for which one can hope to get available emission data. While the 
results share the limitations of other studies due to the absence of more systematic emission data, the 
paper goes beyond previous contributions that focus on a handful of "dirty" industries or a case study of a 
specific pollutant or a specific country. In our unraveling of the PH effect, we have controlled for the 
transport cost component of the PCI as well as other "deep" determinants of the bilateral pollution content 
of trade. This has allowed us to better isolate the role of differences in factor endowments and 
environmental policies. We do find evidence of traditional PH and FE effects that have often been elusive 
in the literature, although these effects cannot be said to be systematic nor quantitatively important or as 
robust as one would wish across all pollutants. 
 
This said, the results suggest diversity in magnitudes across pollutants and a rather small contribution of 
the PHH factors in the overall PCI of world trade, notably because of composition factors usually not 
considered in the debate. Thus, for several pollutants, the PCI of the North is lower because on average its 
endowments are favorable to activities with high emissions and likewise its PCI is higher for other 
pollutants because of the probable delocalization of dirty industries to the South associated with stricter 
environment policies in the North. Yet, for each one of the 10 pollutants we find that these effects 
contribute to less than 10% of the overall determinants of emissions. Taken together, at least for 1986-88, 
it would appear that differences in factor endowments and environmental policies have only marginally   27 
affected the pollution content of world trade although the impact has been stronger on vertical (North-
South) trade flows. These results carry over for one pollutant, SO2, for which country-specific emissions 
and alternative environmental proxies are available for the year 2000. Much like in an earlier debate 
around the Leontief paradox regarding the factor content of US trade, better data will be required to get a 
firmer grasp of the quantitative importance of the effects involved. 
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Appendices to  
 
Unravelling the Worldwide Pollution Haven Effect 
 
 
Bilateral trade flows are taken from the "Trade and Production Database" by Olarreaga and Nicita 
(2001). Imports (imports are known to be more reliable than exports) for 48 developing and developed 
countries are available at the 4-digit ISIC level (see appendix A1 for a country-list).  To transform real 
bilateral trade flows into the pollution content of imports we used the World Bank's "Industrial Pollution 
Pojection System" (IPPS). See Hettige et al. (1995) for a detailed description. These IPPS coefficients 
allow us to estimate the amount of pollution (in pounds or kilograms) emitted per employee by 4-digit 
ISIC. In total 10 different pollutants (see table A3 in Appendix 2 for a detailed list of these pollutants) are 
proposed. Concerning the exact measure, we use the lower bound estimation of pollution per employee. 
Note that these IPP coefficients are strictly speaking only available for 1987 for the US industries. 
Hettige, Mani and Wheeler (2000) show that pollution/labor ratios seem to be roughly constant across 
countries. Hence using employment/output ratios by 3-digit industry (4-digit data are not available) and 
country from the "Trade and Production Database" allows us to compute a pollution per dollar of import 
coefficient specific to each country. 
 
The distance and the common language variables are taken from the CEPII database. The common 
religion variable has been constructed on the basis of the CIA's World fact-book and GDP values are 
extracted from the World Bank’s WDI Indicators (2004). Capital and labor endowment data are from 
Sandeep Mahajan (PRMEP), World Bank 2001. Skill ratios and coal and oil production have been taken 
from Gourdon, Maystre and de Melo (2008)18. The human development index for 1987 has been 
extracted from the UN website. 
 
The data source for the maximum lead content in gasoline has been elaborated by Grether and Mathys 
(2002) on the basis of Octel's Worldwide Gasoline Survey. More precisely the average has been worked 
out by using different types of gasoline and weighting them by their market share. Therefore, the proxy 
constructed takes into account the importance of the different types of gasoline in the overall market. If 
one admits that it is generally more costly to produce gasoline with low lead contents, the selected 
variable represents not only the maximum lead content observed, but also, and this is the important 
feature, in some sense the enforced legal limit of lead content in gasoline. Since it is impossible for the 
moment to obtain an index of environmental stringency for the 80s for a large set of countries, the 
average maximum lead content represents at least one of the most important environmental indicator. 
Note also that Damania et al (2003) showed that this indicator is closely correlated with other proxies for 
environmental stringency. 
 
                                                 
18 Gourdon J., Maystre N. and J. de Melo (2008), "Openness, inequality and poverty: Endowments matter", Journal 
of International Trade and Economic Development, Vol. 17 (3), pp. 343-378.   31 
Appendix 2: Tables 
 
Table A1: Countries in the sample 
Argentina    Jordan 
Australia*    Japan* 
Austria*    Kenya 
Bolivia    Korea, Rep. 
Canada*    Sri Lanka 
Chile    Mexico 
China    Malawi 
Cameroon    Malaysia 
Colombia    Netherlands* 
Costa Rica    Norway* 
Denmark*    New Zealand* 
Ecuador    Pakistan 
Egypt, Arab Rep.    Panama 
Spain*    Peru 
Finland*    Philippines 
France*    Portugal* 
United Kingdom*    Singapore* 
Greece*    Sweden* 
Guatemala    Thailand 
Honduras    Trinidad and Tobago 
Indonesia    Turkey 
India    Uruguay 
Ireland*    United States* 
Italy*    Venezuela, RB 
     
 
Note: 
* stands for developed economies, i.e-. economies where the average GDP per capita over the sample period in 
1995 PPP dollars is higher than $11'000. 
 
The following countries are not covered in the robustness section on SO2 emissions: Cameroon, Guatemala, Sri 
Lanka, Malawi, New Zealand, Pakistan, Portugal, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago. When using the regulatory 
regime index: Turkey is also absent from the sample. 
 
Table A2: Dirty and Clean Sectors 
Dirty  Clean 
ISIC 3-digit    Description  ISIC 3-digit    Description 
341     Paper and products  321     Textiles 
351     Industrial chemicals  382*     Machinery except electrical 
369     Other non-metallic 
mineral products 
383*     Machinery electrical 
371     Iron and steel  384     Transport equipment 
372     Non-ferrous metals  385     Professional and scientific 
equipment 
Note: * These sectors have been classified as overall clean. When only looking at pollution intensity in 
heavy metals however they are on ranks 8 and 9 respectively.                                                                                               
Source: Copeland and Taylor (2003). 
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Table A3: Pollutants 
IPPS-Pollutants - per employee, lower bound 
Pollution share 
of dirty sectors 
(in %)* 
PH-Ratio 
TPTT    Toxic pollution intensity – TOTAL  73  0.63 
MPTT    Toxic metal pollution intensity – TOTAL  85  0.70 
S2AI    SO2 – AIR  65  0.67 
N2AI    NO2 – AIR  61  0.69 
COAI    CO – AIR  59  0.79 
VOAI    Volatile organic compounds – AIR  59  0.52 
FPAI    Fine particulates – AIR  64  0.75 
TSAI    Total suspended particulates – AIR  48  0.56 
BOWT    Biochemical oxygen demand – WATER  79  0.89 
TSWT    Total suspended solids – WATER  91  0.53 
          
Note: *  Dirty sectors account for 18% of total imports.  
 
 
Table A4: Regressions of SO2 emission per worker (per dollar) on constant and GDP per capita PPP in 
constant 2000 international dollars 
Sectors  Emission per worker  Emission per dollar 
   GDP per capita     F-stat  GDP per capita     F-stat 
Refineries, coke and gas  1.59    1.49  -5.91  ***  9.05 
  (1.31)       (1.96)     
Iron and Steel  0.134    0.01  -6.03  ***  13.57 
  (1.28)       (1.64)     
Non-ferrous Metals  4.03  *  3.00  -4.83  **  4.78 
  (2.33)       (2.21)     
Chemicals  1.65    0.97  -5.85  ***  12.19 
  (1.67)       (1.67)     
Building materials 
(cement)  -0.55    0.18  -9.31  ***  61.94 
  (1.32)       (1.18)     
Pulp and Paper  1.69    1.39  -6.57  ***  20.14 
  (1.44)       (1.46)     
             
Note: 
F-stat: F-statistic of the whole regression (including the constant). 
S02 Emission data are from Grether et al (2009). 
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.     
 




Table A5: Confidence Intervals for the decomposition estimates (%) 
                                       
    Biochemical Oxygen Demand Water 





Observations  FE-Effect  PH-Effect  TOT Effect  FE-Effect  PH-Effect  TOT Effect  FE-Effect  PH-Effect  TOT Effect 
NS  544  -75  ;  -60  167 ;  180  -34  ;  12  -53  ;  -34  107 ;  122  -3  ;  47  -48  ;  -27  101 ;   111  4  ;  55 
SN  565  118 ;  138  -77  ;  -63  -50  ;  -11  56  ;  66  -73  ;  -55  -58  ;  -26  38  ;  47  -72  ;  -56  -61  ;  -35 
NS+SN  1109  -26  ;  -11  -17  ;  20  -38  ;  6  -18  ;  -5  -3  ;  33  -20  ;  26  -15  ;  -1  -8  ;  23  -21  ;  23 
NN  342  -1  ;  -1  9  ;  17  8  ;  16  -1  ;  0  5  ;  13  4  ;  13  0  ;  0  -7  ;  0  -7  ;  1 
SS  656  -26  ;  -18  -16  ;  -15  -38  ;  -31  -4  ;  1  -6  ;  -5  -10  ;  -4  -7  ;  -3  -9  ;  -8  -16  ;  -11 
NN+SS  998  -2  ;  -1  9  ;  16  7  ;  15  -1  ;  0  5  ;  12  4  ;  12  0  ;  0  -7  ;  0  -7  ;  0 
World  2107  -6  ;  -2  5  ;  17  -1  ;  14  -5  ;  -1  3  ;  16  -2  ;  15  -4  ;  0  -7  ;  5  -11  ;  5 
                                       
Notes:                                       
95% Confidence intervals on the predicted values are reported. 
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Table A6: Decomposition of the PCI into the FE and the PH-Effect (in %) with Changing Income Group Definition 
                       
      Biochemical Oxygen Demand 










Observations  FE-Effect  PH-Effect  TOT Effect  FE-Effect  PH-Effect  TOT Effect  FE-Effect  PH-Effect  TOT Effect 
NS 
Initial  544  -86  173  -14  -44  114  20  -38  106  27 
Higher  473  -54  111  -3  -40  112  27  -33  97  31 
Lower  549  -69  166  -20  -46  16  11  -40  99  19 
SN 
Initial  565  127  -70  -33  61  -65  -44  42  -64  -49 
Higher  489  78  -60  -28  46  -58  -38  32  -56  -42 
Lower  575  164  -63  -3  76  -52  -16  52  -53  -29 
NS+SN 
Initial  1109  -19  1  -19  -13  15  1  -8  8  -1 
Higher  962  -8  -3  -12  -8  12  3  -5  4  -1 
Lower  1124  -31  20  -17  -19  30  5  -15  25  6 
NN 
Initial  342  -1  13  12  -1  9  9  0  -3  -3 
Higher  182  -1  16  14  -1  11  10  0  -3  -3 
Lower  550  0  11  11  1  7  8  1  -6  -4 
SS 
Initial  656  -22  -16  -34  -1  -6  -7  -5  -9  -13 
Higher  963  -33  -12  -41  -12  -3  -15  -11  -7  -17 
Lower  433  -29  -21  -45  -10  -11  -19  -11  -14  -23 
NN+SS 
Initial  998  -2  13  11  -1  9  8  0  -3  -4 
Higher  1145  -3  15  11  -2  9  8  -1  -3  -4 
Lower  983  0  11  10  -0  6  7  1  -6  -5 
                       
Notes:                       
a) See notes table3. 
b) Higher: Treshold at US $ 15'000; Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Singapore and Spain become Southern countries. 
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  Table A7: Decomposition of the PCI into the FE and the PH-Effect (%) 
Results from OLS regression, previous 2SLS results in parenthesis 
 
                                   
      Biochemical Oxygen Demand 
Water (BOWT) 
  SO2 in the Air (SO2)    Total Toxic Pollution Intensity 
(TPTT) 
 
Row  Import Flows 

























  21 
(-14) 




  -46 
(20) 




  -49 
(27) 
 




  -17 
(-33) 




  55 
(-44) 




  57 
(-49) 
 




  11 
(-19) 




  -39 
(1) 




  -42 
(-1) 
 




  10 
(12) 




  0 
(9) 




  0 
(-3) 
 




  -14 
(-34) 




  0 
(-7) 




  -8 
(-13) 
 




  10 
(11) 




  0 
(8) 




  -1 
(-4) 
 




  10 
(7) 




  -12 
(6) 




  -16 
(-3) 
 
                                   
                                   
  Notes:                                 
 
a) NS: North imports from the South, SN: South imports from the North, NN: North imports from the North, SS: 
South imports from the South. 
           
  Along rows: TOT = (1+FE)*(1+PH) -1,  
Along columns: AGGv = θ*CMP1+(1-θ)*CMP2  where  AGGv is the aggregate effect (v = NS+SN, NN+SS, World) CMP1 and  CMP2 are the two 
corresponding components and θ is the share of  CMP1 in the relevant PCI (Ω  for the FE and the TOT effects, Ω ĸ for the PH effect , Ω ĸ ℓ   is only 
reported for the sake of completeness). 
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Table A8: Variable Description 
     
Variabe  Description  Source 
E/L  Pollution per employee  IPPS, World Bank (for SO2: Grether et al 2009) 
L/X  Inverse labour productivity  Trade and Production Database, 1976-2000 
M  Bilateral import flows  Trade and Production Database, 1976-2000 
DIST  Geodesic Distance between the most important cities  http://www.cepii.fr 
MKT  Product of GDPs  World Bank Development Indicator 2004 
CR  Common Religion  Correlation Coefficient, based on CIA's World Factsbook 
CL  Dummy for common language  http://www.cepii.fr 
LL  Dummy for landlockedness  http://www.cepii.fr 
SK 
Proportion of population over 15 years with completed 
primary education with respect to population with less 
than 4 years of schooling in 1987. 
Barro and Lee (2000) 
HK 
Proportion of population over 15 years with completed 
high education with respect to population with less 
than 4 years of schooling in 1987. 
Barro and Lee (2000) 
COAL  Production of coal  World Energy Council (2004) 
OIL  Production of oil  World Energy Council (2004) 
LEAD  Average maximum lead content in gasoline  Octels world wide gasoline survey, prepaired base available on 
http://www2.unine.ch/Jahia/site/irene/op/edit/pid/12149?matrix=101 
 
Alternative measures of environmental regulation: 
Air pollution regulation 
Regulatory Regime Index 
WEF's Global competitiveness report 
Esty and Porter (2005) 
K/L  Capital to labour ratio  Sandeep Mahajan (PRMEP), World Bank 2001 
HDI  Human development indicator for 1987  United Nations Database NOTE DI LAVORO DELLA FONDAZIONE ENI ENRICO MATTEI 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Paper Series 
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